Summary Comments: Chapter 7

CHAPTER 7, BUSINESS AND CIVIC EROSION, 1917-1950

Rae opens by reminding us of the power of the "creative destruction" of capitalism in a quote from Lewis Mumford's "City in History." (endnote #1)

The urbanizing technologies of the 19th century -- those centripetal forces -- had run their course by the time of Mayor Frank Rice's death (1917). So, we are reminded again about the decentralizing forces about to be unleashed. (see mid. p. 216)

Note the tremendous production and profit spikes of industry during WWI. And because of their growth, these companies became more national and eventually international and lost their local grounding. Less and less concern for the health and well-being of New Haven. This was such a big loss because these businesses had provided the tax revenue, jobs, (the "economic juice"), leadership that made governance during the Rice administration that much easier. (p. 218)
(1) The impact on labor (in terms of loss of jobs primarily) was especially great. (see bottom pp. 220-1)
(2) The out-migration of major industry did not take place overnight. It was a slow but irreversible movement, facilitated by movement away from the fixed-route rail system to the variable-route trucking/auto system, which would be greatly accelerated after 1960 when highways improved greatly.

Then, comes the automobile and the "smell of profit."

"Urban Thrombosis" -- clogging the arteries of the city; at first, the automobile clogged central city streets before it opened up the metro. area to development.
(1) At first the automobile is for the privileged only, but Henry Ford's Model T would change all that, making the car affordable for almost anyone. Amazing how rapidly it caught on. Also significant were all the other manufacturing interests that got behind it too. (see, bottom, p. 225) By the mid 1930s, as many as 100,000 cars and trucks were penetrating the city center of New Haven.

Rae notes growth of suburbs before mid-century, at first supported by the trolley. Suburban development would eventually lead to out-migration not just of people but perhaps more important, taxable property -- the "grand list" of homes, etc.

Consolidation in the grocery business with A&P, undercutting the "thick fabric of enterprise" of some 600 small, neighborhood "mom & pop" stores, which provided a livelihood for so many as well. "Relentless price competition, reliable supply chains, and strategic location made these stores formidable machines of creative destruction." (p. 238) They were "factory assembly lines for consumption." (p. 238) And they would eventually be overtaken by even larger superstores, like the 8- theater complexes replacing the single theater, and now 8-theater complexes being replaced by 16 and 24-theater complexes. "If a thing is worth doing, it is often, in the heat of capitalist turmoil, worth overdoing." (p. 241) And as local chains are bought up by larger national chains, there is less and less cocnern for local life.

Rae reminds us of the importance of the rich "civic fauna" of voluntary organizations which is now threatened. Catholic parish system, other religious groups, hold on, but many other voluntary organizations go out of existence. Charitable organizations come to be managed by professional social workers (replacing the "blue collar potentates").

And Yale spreads its wings and reaches out for national prominence; selects a president who is NOT from the New Haven area or a member of the "club." Note Yale transformation, top, p. 248.

Nice summary of these changes, last long paragraph, pp. 252-253.
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That's all for now. I'll post summary comments on Chapter 8 soon.