So, for all of mayor Lee's efforts, New Haven had obviously not become the slumless city it aspired to become. Just the opposite, slums continued and crime got much worse.
How to respond to this failure? (1) Obviously, politics had not worked, so (2) a market approach took hold, the ultimate market solution to the end of urbanism being the suburban exodus, an exit strategy which obviously further weakened the central city. (And I would add here, that suburbs really did not attempt to re-create "urbanism" -- it was more of a privatized solution.)
Rae comes back to Joe and Hope Perfetto's story. Their move to the suburbs in 1950, although they continued to operate their business in New Haven until they retired. Notes how the FHA, tax advantages helped democratize the suburbs, open them up to people like the Perfettos. Their mortgage was $7,000 and monthly payment a mere $52.50.
In terms of CULTURAL SUPPORT for escaping the city, Rae notes that historically, before industrialization, people in the city had green space, gardens. But industrialization, with its noise, pollution, demand for cheap housing for workers (tenements) pretty much wiped this out.
"The Perfettos' suburban home, built after many decades of centered urbanism, can be understood in part as an attempt to recapture these same features from the collective memory, with all their "healthfulness" and openness." (p. 399)
Robert Fishman gives a nice description of the characteristic traits of suburbia. See, top p. 400.
Suburban development seems to wed what was good for humanity with greed -- a marriage that sold like hotcakes in mid-20th century America. Bottom pp. 400-401 identifies all the private interests that backed this suburban venture, even enlisting the support of government. This should give us pause, that something so wildly popular would, as we will see especially in "The Geography of Nowhere," be so destructive in the long run energy-wise, envirnomentally, even socially.
Rae talks about class divisions among suburbs and between the suburbs collectively and New Haven. New Haven being left behind in many repects with concentrated black poverty. (See, bottom p. 405)
Politics After Urbanism: Decline of the G.O.P., many Republicans moving to the suburbs. Dominance of the Democrats. But as the Democrats take over, New Haven diminishes in terms of population, political clout, etc. Have the MARGINALIZATION of city politics. Pluralist government becomes limited in what it can do. But Rae does not agree with the Domhoff thesis that the well-to-do take over, a conspiracy of who rules. Dahl (Rae's mentor on politics) concludes that currently New Haven politics can be characterized more as a "street-fighting pluralism," pitting neighborhoods against each other.
The old urbanism and the forces which created it are largely gone. Is there "another urbanism?" we can build in its place?
Rae suggests there are steps that can be taken to encourage the "soft" side of urbanism, mainly steps concerned citizens themselves can take to re-build social capital, restore civility, etc. (See, pp. 422-426 for specifics)
(As beneficial and "warm and fuzzy" as these recommendations sound, I was disappointed in this as his main proposals to deal with the decline of urbanism. None of these recommendations seems anywhere near adequate to deal with the problems of New Haven highlighted in Chapter 11, especially crime, unemployment, etc. I can't help but think that New Haven and most other cities are still largely at the mercy of the capitalist forces of "creative destruction.")
Finally, Rae deals with the emergence of Yale University as the major player in New Haven, perhaps New Haven's salvation. Yet there are problems in terms of Yale's proposals for expansion and city government dragging its feet, and one can also argue that Yale is a somewhat detached institution, not rooted in New Haven as it once was.
So, that leaves us with this big question: what can be done to restore cities such as New Haven "after urbanism?"
________________________________
That's it. Remember that I certainly may make up some final exam questions based on these summary comments on all the Chapters of "City." See you next week.
Friday, October 29, 2010
Wednesday, October 27, 2010
Chapter 11: The End of Urbanism - Summary Comments
Below are my summary comments on Chapter 11. The previous blog post contains a description of what I want you to do for extra credit, if you attend the talk by former Austin,TX mayor Will Wynn tomorrow (Thurs. 10/28) at 11AM in Leonard Aud.
CHAPTER 11: THE END OF URBANISM
Rae opens by describing the precipitous drop in manufacturing in New Haven -- the closing of factories and even more rapid decline in factory employment.
1. The Lee administration thought the new Interstate highways (I-95 & I-91) intersecting in the center of New Haven would encourage manufacturers to locate there. Instead, "...the highways decentralized everything they touched."
2. There was a 60% decline in factory jobs during the Lee redevelopment era.
3. Two larger historical trends contributed to this as well: (a) competition from the Sunbelt. Sunbelt cities having the advantages of lower taxes, lower energy costs, lower labor costs, etc. Not to mention global competition. (b) regional competition opened up by interstate highways: more land to build on, lower taxes, fewer security concerns (crime), etc.
All told: "The impact was immense -- fewer good jobs, especially fewer good working class jobs, fewer opportunities for high school graduates without academic pretentions, fewer households in the city, fewer taxable properties, fewer dollars flowing from wage earners to neighborhood merchants, decreasing leverage for city government in regulating central-place land use." (p. 363)
Then, the strike at the Winchester plant added insult to injury. See top, p. 367. Cites catastrophic job loss over 40+ years (1954-1997) - 90%!
The "fabric of enterprise" was torn to pieces. Neighborhood grocery store decline (although Rae also notes that larger stores were more efficient, cheaper).
Notes that Lee's redevelopment policies did contribute to this decline -- many stores closed due to urban renewal. But, again, larger forces at play contributed more to this. Seems like a long, irresistible trend, helped along by zoning regulations which separated commercial and residential space.
"What eventually emerged, and prevails today, was utterly different from the fabric of enterprise described in Chapter 3."
Rae observes the "dispersion of the grand list," p. 373f -- that is, the grand list of taxable property which gets dispersed to suburban areas. Table 11.3, p. 374, tells this dramatic story in dollars.
Another aspect of the end of urbanism is the decline of voluntary organizations. And here again we clearly see larger forces at work such as the rise of television and the growth of technology which catered to individuals more than the general public, as that long passage from Robert Putnam ("Bowling Alone") brings out. pp. 377-8.
You have the "professionalization of civic fauna" -- that is organizations that used to involve city residents, now being managed by professional staff. And those professionals had less connection with the communities they served.
Mainstream, institutionalized religions decline, such as the Catholics, and are replaced by smaller, storefront churches. They become dominant influences in many working-class, ghetto neighborhoods.
Public housing declines as these areas become areas of concentrated poverty and crime. They tie poor people to an inner city that offers few amenities and opportunities. New Haven makes the top ten list in pecentage of city residents living below the poverty line. (see p. 385)
Perhaps most telling of the end of urbanism is the tremendous increase in crime, especially violent crime -- see graph p. 387 and Table 11-4 at bottom. In this context, Rae reminds us of one of the benefits of a vibrant urbanism -- effectiveness at controlling crime which no police department can accomplish on its own. "A major part of what I mean by urbanism is the effectiveness of these extragovernmental mechanisms for the most fundamental task of governance -- preventing criminal aggression in the city's streets and homes. These informal mechanisms had become ineffective, at great cost to the livability of the city." (p. 389)
Rae introduces an interesting term in the last section, "useful ineffciency" -- that urbanism had a massive collection of useful inefficiencies, from mom-and-pop grocery stores to smaller streets, etc. which served important purposes even if they were inefficient from the point of view of the market. He also stresses that those pushing technological change, market efficiency are not villains.
But this raises a big question in my mind: SHOULD WE NECESSARILY ASPIRE TO MARKET EFFICIENCY AT THE EXPENSE OF URBANISM?
__________________________
That's all for now. I'll post summary comments for Chapter 12 by the end of the week. And remember, we are going to get into "Heat Wave" on Thursday (11/28) and be meeting in our old place, Main 122.
CHAPTER 11: THE END OF URBANISM
Rae opens by describing the precipitous drop in manufacturing in New Haven -- the closing of factories and even more rapid decline in factory employment.
1. The Lee administration thought the new Interstate highways (I-95 & I-91) intersecting in the center of New Haven would encourage manufacturers to locate there. Instead, "...the highways decentralized everything they touched."
2. There was a 60% decline in factory jobs during the Lee redevelopment era.
3. Two larger historical trends contributed to this as well: (a) competition from the Sunbelt. Sunbelt cities having the advantages of lower taxes, lower energy costs, lower labor costs, etc. Not to mention global competition. (b) regional competition opened up by interstate highways: more land to build on, lower taxes, fewer security concerns (crime), etc.
All told: "The impact was immense -- fewer good jobs, especially fewer good working class jobs, fewer opportunities for high school graduates without academic pretentions, fewer households in the city, fewer taxable properties, fewer dollars flowing from wage earners to neighborhood merchants, decreasing leverage for city government in regulating central-place land use." (p. 363)
Then, the strike at the Winchester plant added insult to injury. See top, p. 367. Cites catastrophic job loss over 40+ years (1954-1997) - 90%!
The "fabric of enterprise" was torn to pieces. Neighborhood grocery store decline (although Rae also notes that larger stores were more efficient, cheaper).
Notes that Lee's redevelopment policies did contribute to this decline -- many stores closed due to urban renewal. But, again, larger forces at play contributed more to this. Seems like a long, irresistible trend, helped along by zoning regulations which separated commercial and residential space.
"What eventually emerged, and prevails today, was utterly different from the fabric of enterprise described in Chapter 3."
Rae observes the "dispersion of the grand list," p. 373f -- that is, the grand list of taxable property which gets dispersed to suburban areas. Table 11.3, p. 374, tells this dramatic story in dollars.
Another aspect of the end of urbanism is the decline of voluntary organizations. And here again we clearly see larger forces at work such as the rise of television and the growth of technology which catered to individuals more than the general public, as that long passage from Robert Putnam ("Bowling Alone") brings out. pp. 377-8.
You have the "professionalization of civic fauna" -- that is organizations that used to involve city residents, now being managed by professional staff. And those professionals had less connection with the communities they served.
Mainstream, institutionalized religions decline, such as the Catholics, and are replaced by smaller, storefront churches. They become dominant influences in many working-class, ghetto neighborhoods.
Public housing declines as these areas become areas of concentrated poverty and crime. They tie poor people to an inner city that offers few amenities and opportunities. New Haven makes the top ten list in pecentage of city residents living below the poverty line. (see p. 385)
Perhaps most telling of the end of urbanism is the tremendous increase in crime, especially violent crime -- see graph p. 387 and Table 11-4 at bottom. In this context, Rae reminds us of one of the benefits of a vibrant urbanism -- effectiveness at controlling crime which no police department can accomplish on its own. "A major part of what I mean by urbanism is the effectiveness of these extragovernmental mechanisms for the most fundamental task of governance -- preventing criminal aggression in the city's streets and homes. These informal mechanisms had become ineffective, at great cost to the livability of the city." (p. 389)
Rae introduces an interesting term in the last section, "useful ineffciency" -- that urbanism had a massive collection of useful inefficiencies, from mom-and-pop grocery stores to smaller streets, etc. which served important purposes even if they were inefficient from the point of view of the market. He also stresses that those pushing technological change, market efficiency are not villains.
But this raises a big question in my mind: SHOULD WE NECESSARILY ASPIRE TO MARKET EFFICIENCY AT THE EXPENSE OF URBANISM?
__________________________
That's all for now. I'll post summary comments for Chapter 12 by the end of the week. And remember, we are going to get into "Heat Wave" on Thursday (11/28) and be meeting in our old place, Main 122.
Thursday, October 21, 2010
Extra Credit Opportunity
Next Thursday, Oct. 28th at 11AM in Leonard Aud. the former mayor of Austin, TX is going to be speaking on sustainability and cities. By attending this talk and writing up a one-page response you can earn 5 points extra credit. In your response I'd like you to focus on the speaker's main message in his talk and any point he may make that has relevance for what we've talked about in class so far. Given the fact that in our book, "City," the author focused on some of the mayors in New Haven's history, you should be able to relate something this former mayor has to say to the experience of these New Haven mayors.
Please post your response as a comment on this blog post no later than one week following this talk (or Thurs., Nov. 4th) to earn the 5 points extra credit.
Please post your response as a comment on this blog post no later than one week following this talk (or Thurs., Nov. 4th) to earn the 5 points extra credit.
Monday, October 18, 2010
Summary Comments: Chapter 10
SUMMARY COMMENTS: CHAPTER 10: EXTRAORDINARY POLITICS: DICK LEE, URBAN RENEWAL, AND THE END OF URBANISM
Dick Lee takes office in Jan. '54, and he knows he is good at politics (in some ways like Frank Rice was good as mayor -- cultivating personal relationships, etc.). But there was an important difference -- Lee knew the city had big problems that would require leadership, and "extraordinary" politics to address. But Lee was unaware of some aspects of the city that would undermine his efforts to improve it. On the top of p. 313, Rae notes that Lee was great at GOVERNMENT but failed in terms of GOVERNANCE.
Rae defines what he means by "renewing" the city, certainly NOT the kind of renewal the Lee administration practiced. Rae outlines a "tall order," basically the restoration of urbanism in the face of the "accidents of urban destruction" (p. 313) See also the bullet points, pp. 313-314.
Lee's situation also different from Rices's in 1910. (a) sharp decline in grounded leadership; (b) end of urbanism (p. 315)
1. But counterbalancing these losses, was the large-scale help from the federal government, which Lee virtually created an alternative government (the Kremlin) to tap into and carry out urban renewal on a grand scale -- this was the "extraordinary politics" of the Lee era.
2. He recruited the smartest, most arrogant people to manage this massive urban renewal effort.
3. I like the name for this shadow government -- the Kremlin.
4. Kind of urban redevelopment laid out in the 1949 Housing Act was large-scale, hardly favorable to small-scale urbanism. (see p. 318)
In contrast to the standard view of public bureaucracies as inefficient, low quality results -- "Lee's Kremlin was a startling exception: its project plans, its budgetary ingenuity, its shrewd organizational workings, its capacity to compete for federal funding, all of these and more of its aspects were of the very highest quality." (p. 321)
Organic analogy -- federal aorta pumping economic energy into the Kremlin.
Got an amazing amount of money from federal govt. -- on a per capita basis, far and away the highest of all U.S. cities by a wide margin. (see p. 320)
Lee creates Citizens Action Committee (CAC) made up of business leaders supportive of his plans, to blunt criticism of the harm done under the guise of urban renewal. These leaders were not really "grounded" in the city, more of an invented elite.
Impact of Urban Renewal (pp. 320-321), stresses the devastation wrought by highway building in particular.
Notes the "modernist ideas" that are reflected in Lee's urban renewal program, even if Lee was unaware of modernist thinkers and architects such as Le Corbusier. See all of pp. 332-333. Clearly hostile to urbanism. Especially Vincent Scully's critique, to which Lee responds personally (p. 335)
Residential and Racial Impact of Urban Renewal
1. Note observation of the first director of New Haven's Family Relocation Office - "the job is impossible" (p. 338)
2. Tremendous numbers of people relocated.
3. Proportionally, it was mainly "Negro Removal" and the Africanization of public housing. But also at the center of this story is "White Removal" to the suburbs, which was voluntary and encouraged. Over 50,000 whites left New Haven, 1950-70.
Business impact of urban renewal was often lethal, especially for small business that once made up the thick fabric of enterprise of urbanism. Even a downtown mall ultimately failed.
All this urban renewal and redevelopment could not make up for the decline in manufacturing that had been the basis for so much of New Haven's economic life.
Lee did recognize that all this change was not necessarily doing poor people much good, so he created the "sociological version of Ed Logue's Kremlin -- Community Progress, Inc. (CPI), which grew fat with federal money (300 full-time employees). Instituted job training programs, although not enough jobs were available. Really did not involve or engage the poor themselves.
Lee and CPI staff recognized that: "...even the best built public housing sometimes created 'nothing but transplanted ghettos where the poor are lost among the poor, the alienated among the alienated, unmotivated school children consigned to schools full of their own.'" (p. 349)
Model to the Nation -- yet New Haven and Dick Lee are praised nationally. (p. 351) Receive "Model Cities" designation.
Then, a race riot, Aug. 1967. Politcal impact great. How could this happen in a "model city?"
Lee could not deliver jobs to these areas -- "mousetrapped by history." See, bottom p. 354.
CPI really out of touch: "an overly centralized, paternalistic, big brother institution, manned by 'planner administrators' who believe they know what is best for everyone." (p. 356)
In many ways, Lee was a remarkable mayor (bottom, p. 357), yet the forces of creative destruction which led to the end of urbanism would undermine even his best efforts. See last paragraph, p. 360.
___________________________________
See you tomorrow to begin wrapping up this urban saga.
Dick Lee takes office in Jan. '54, and he knows he is good at politics (in some ways like Frank Rice was good as mayor -- cultivating personal relationships, etc.). But there was an important difference -- Lee knew the city had big problems that would require leadership, and "extraordinary" politics to address. But Lee was unaware of some aspects of the city that would undermine his efforts to improve it. On the top of p. 313, Rae notes that Lee was great at GOVERNMENT but failed in terms of GOVERNANCE.
Rae defines what he means by "renewing" the city, certainly NOT the kind of renewal the Lee administration practiced. Rae outlines a "tall order," basically the restoration of urbanism in the face of the "accidents of urban destruction" (p. 313) See also the bullet points, pp. 313-314.
Lee's situation also different from Rices's in 1910. (a) sharp decline in grounded leadership; (b) end of urbanism (p. 315)
1. But counterbalancing these losses, was the large-scale help from the federal government, which Lee virtually created an alternative government (the Kremlin) to tap into and carry out urban renewal on a grand scale -- this was the "extraordinary politics" of the Lee era.
2. He recruited the smartest, most arrogant people to manage this massive urban renewal effort.
3. I like the name for this shadow government -- the Kremlin.
4. Kind of urban redevelopment laid out in the 1949 Housing Act was large-scale, hardly favorable to small-scale urbanism. (see p. 318)
In contrast to the standard view of public bureaucracies as inefficient, low quality results -- "Lee's Kremlin was a startling exception: its project plans, its budgetary ingenuity, its shrewd organizational workings, its capacity to compete for federal funding, all of these and more of its aspects were of the very highest quality." (p. 321)
Organic analogy -- federal aorta pumping economic energy into the Kremlin.
Got an amazing amount of money from federal govt. -- on a per capita basis, far and away the highest of all U.S. cities by a wide margin. (see p. 320)
Lee creates Citizens Action Committee (CAC) made up of business leaders supportive of his plans, to blunt criticism of the harm done under the guise of urban renewal. These leaders were not really "grounded" in the city, more of an invented elite.
Impact of Urban Renewal (pp. 320-321), stresses the devastation wrought by highway building in particular.
Notes the "modernist ideas" that are reflected in Lee's urban renewal program, even if Lee was unaware of modernist thinkers and architects such as Le Corbusier. See all of pp. 332-333. Clearly hostile to urbanism. Especially Vincent Scully's critique, to which Lee responds personally (p. 335)
Residential and Racial Impact of Urban Renewal
1. Note observation of the first director of New Haven's Family Relocation Office - "the job is impossible" (p. 338)
2. Tremendous numbers of people relocated.
3. Proportionally, it was mainly "Negro Removal" and the Africanization of public housing. But also at the center of this story is "White Removal" to the suburbs, which was voluntary and encouraged. Over 50,000 whites left New Haven, 1950-70.
Business impact of urban renewal was often lethal, especially for small business that once made up the thick fabric of enterprise of urbanism. Even a downtown mall ultimately failed.
All this urban renewal and redevelopment could not make up for the decline in manufacturing that had been the basis for so much of New Haven's economic life.
Lee did recognize that all this change was not necessarily doing poor people much good, so he created the "sociological version of Ed Logue's Kremlin -- Community Progress, Inc. (CPI), which grew fat with federal money (300 full-time employees). Instituted job training programs, although not enough jobs were available. Really did not involve or engage the poor themselves.
Lee and CPI staff recognized that: "...even the best built public housing sometimes created 'nothing but transplanted ghettos where the poor are lost among the poor, the alienated among the alienated, unmotivated school children consigned to schools full of their own.'" (p. 349)
Model to the Nation -- yet New Haven and Dick Lee are praised nationally. (p. 351) Receive "Model Cities" designation.
Then, a race riot, Aug. 1967. Politcal impact great. How could this happen in a "model city?"
Lee could not deliver jobs to these areas -- "mousetrapped by history." See, bottom p. 354.
CPI really out of touch: "an overly centralized, paternalistic, big brother institution, manned by 'planner administrators' who believe they know what is best for everyone." (p. 356)
In many ways, Lee was a remarkable mayor (bottom, p. 357), yet the forces of creative destruction which led to the end of urbanism would undermine even his best efforts. See last paragraph, p. 360.
___________________________________
See you tomorrow to begin wrapping up this urban saga.
Saturday, October 16, 2010
Summary Comments: Chapter 9
CHAPTER 9: INVENTING DICK LEE
I love that story about "snow tickets" (end of Chapter 8), which introduces the subject of Chapter 9, Dick Lee. It harkens back to a more "urbanist" time in New Haven. We'll see later (Chap. 10) how Dick Lee's tenure as mayor will in many ways belie that urbanist experience.
Opens by underscoring the importance of Dick Lee's (partial) Irish heritage and Irish patronage. "Dick Lee was deeply grounded in ward politics and chose, for obvious reasons, to stress his Irish blood at the expense of the Scottish and English plasmas with which he was in fact diluted. He never for an instant imagined himself giving up his lace-curtain Irish identity or his place in the city's street corner urbanism."
1. He was also nutured by the DTC (Democratic Town Committee).
Then there was the rivalry between Italian politicians recruited by the Republican party and the Democratic Irish.
Italian-American mayor, Celentano (1945-53), was very much in the mold of Frank Rice -- focusing on providing government services well. Nicely state, see middle p. 295. Because he was so focused on the small scale, he did not see that so much was changing around the city.
One of those changes being traffic congestion on New Haven streets, with average speeds around 5mph. Parking was also strangling the downtown area. Trolleys were losing out to the automobile (but there were other factors at play in the demise of the trolleys nationwide -- a conspiracy to dismantle them led by GM). (see p. 296)
Suburban development picking up. School populations declining.
Add insult to injury, HOLC had declared most New Haven residential areas a bad mortgage risk; favored the suburbs.
Above changes announce the "end of urbanism." (see middle, p. 298)
Ethnic mayors, like Celentano, continued to be "detail men" - attending to city services even as the city as a whole was undergoing significant change.
Rae then notes Lee's strong reaction to visiting a slum when he was campaigning. This is the beginning of what will become his consuming interest in URBAN RENEWAL. "Slum clearance and redevelopment quickly became Lee's passion,..." (p. 304) A problem was the "top-down" approach of the Federal government: do something TO or FOR city neighborhoods, but not WITH them. Also believed in "environmental determinism," that "good buildings make good neighborhoods," when in reality it is more "good neighborhoods make good buildings." (p. 305) And Rae goes on to give a glimpse of the heavy hand of urban renewal which clearly undermined urbanism.
Lee believed current city government was incapable of making the needed changes.
_______________________
That's all for now. I'll post summary comments on Chapter 10 early next week.
I love that story about "snow tickets" (end of Chapter 8), which introduces the subject of Chapter 9, Dick Lee. It harkens back to a more "urbanist" time in New Haven. We'll see later (Chap. 10) how Dick Lee's tenure as mayor will in many ways belie that urbanist experience.
Opens by underscoring the importance of Dick Lee's (partial) Irish heritage and Irish patronage. "Dick Lee was deeply grounded in ward politics and chose, for obvious reasons, to stress his Irish blood at the expense of the Scottish and English plasmas with which he was in fact diluted. He never for an instant imagined himself giving up his lace-curtain Irish identity or his place in the city's street corner urbanism."
1. He was also nutured by the DTC (Democratic Town Committee).
Then there was the rivalry between Italian politicians recruited by the Republican party and the Democratic Irish.
Italian-American mayor, Celentano (1945-53), was very much in the mold of Frank Rice -- focusing on providing government services well. Nicely state, see middle p. 295. Because he was so focused on the small scale, he did not see that so much was changing around the city.
One of those changes being traffic congestion on New Haven streets, with average speeds around 5mph. Parking was also strangling the downtown area. Trolleys were losing out to the automobile (but there were other factors at play in the demise of the trolleys nationwide -- a conspiracy to dismantle them led by GM). (see p. 296)
Suburban development picking up. School populations declining.
Add insult to injury, HOLC had declared most New Haven residential areas a bad mortgage risk; favored the suburbs.
Above changes announce the "end of urbanism." (see middle, p. 298)
Ethnic mayors, like Celentano, continued to be "detail men" - attending to city services even as the city as a whole was undergoing significant change.
Rae then notes Lee's strong reaction to visiting a slum when he was campaigning. This is the beginning of what will become his consuming interest in URBAN RENEWAL. "Slum clearance and redevelopment quickly became Lee's passion,..." (p. 304) A problem was the "top-down" approach of the Federal government: do something TO or FOR city neighborhoods, but not WITH them. Also believed in "environmental determinism," that "good buildings make good neighborhoods," when in reality it is more "good neighborhoods make good buildings." (p. 305) And Rae goes on to give a glimpse of the heavy hand of urban renewal which clearly undermined urbanism.
Lee believed current city government was incapable of making the needed changes.
_______________________
That's all for now. I'll post summary comments on Chapter 10 early next week.
Wednesday, October 13, 2010
Summary Comments: Chapter 8
CHAPTER 8: RACE, PLACE, AND THE EMERGENCE OF SPATIAL HIERARCHY
Opens with a personal story (Arwildie Windsley) who came to New Haven from Beaufort, S.C. as part of the "Great Migration."
"The Windsleys traveled in the vanguard of a great migration, which brought roughly 150,000 southern blacks north annually from WWII's industrial boom until the 1970s." (p. 255) (Actually, this was the tail end of the Great Migration of Blacks from South to North.)
1. Many residential areas were closed to them, as well as jobs.
First public housing project (Elm Haven) is built and at first considered a great success, but then, largely due to the closing of the Winchester plant, jobs and savings evaporate, and this public housing project would be transformed into a civic and economic disaster by century's end.
Unfortunately for blacks migrating north, this was the time of the "end of urbanism," as Rae describes:
"One historical fact about race asserts itslef in every aspect of New Haven's history after about 1950. The timing of the black migration to New Haven was an economic horror: if the goal was to capture high wage manufacturing jobs in and near central-city neighborhoods -- jobs that could be performed without advanced education -- the timing couldn't have been worse." (p. 258)
And another nice quote: "Ardie's adult life was spent struggling against the swift tide of creative destruction, at its point of convergence with racial segregation, at increasing spatial separation from an incresingly decentralized industrial system. She had, by the time she left town, lived through the end of urbanism." (p. 260)
Three actions which reinforced neighborhood inequality --
1. municipal zoning
2. neighborhood security studies of HOLC (Home Owners Loan Corp.)
3. initial phases of public housing
Zoning defined on p. 261. Initially zoning was a reaction to negative environmental and health effects of industrial production. In New Haven, as elsewhere, they separated heavy industry and commerce from residential areas. Major effect: "...to shift spaces away from heterogeneity of uses. No longer would it be easy to turn a corner house into a corner store. No longer would mixed-use neighborhoods be seen as the urban norm." According to Jane Jacobs, this leads to a reduction of security, confidence, real human value.
HOLC and New Deal evaluations of neighborhoods:
**practice of REDLINING, which created a self-fulfilling prophecy of decline in areas where minorities were concentrated. Criteria clearly racist, see p. 265. HOLC rejected the very idea of a diverse, immigrant city. Racism did reflect values that drove the housing market. see p. 266. HOLC team clearly placed great weight on newness and on isolation from difference, which obviously favored suburban housing.
"HOLC's stated intention in conducting residential security studies was to steer mortgage money toward economically safe neighborhoods and away from economically dangerous ones....the HOLC evaluations achieved that goal through accurate appraisal, given the historical prejudices abroad in the real estate markets of that period." (pp. 272-3)
Public housing begins (Elm Haven). No stigma in early years of public housing. But would come to be looked upon very negatively. Despite the best of intentions, public housing tends to anchor people (mainly Blacks) to poor neighborhoods with few opportunities. Concentration effects of so many poor people in the projects -- crime, drugs, etc. (June Manning Thomas talks about this in Detroit.)
Ghetto comes to be identified with Blacks (defined, p. 280). "The intense marginalization of black ghettoes is an inescapable element in the end of urbanism story." (p. 280)
Opens with a personal story (Arwildie Windsley) who came to New Haven from Beaufort, S.C. as part of the "Great Migration."
"The Windsleys traveled in the vanguard of a great migration, which brought roughly 150,000 southern blacks north annually from WWII's industrial boom until the 1970s." (p. 255) (Actually, this was the tail end of the Great Migration of Blacks from South to North.)
1. Many residential areas were closed to them, as well as jobs.
First public housing project (Elm Haven) is built and at first considered a great success, but then, largely due to the closing of the Winchester plant, jobs and savings evaporate, and this public housing project would be transformed into a civic and economic disaster by century's end.
Unfortunately for blacks migrating north, this was the time of the "end of urbanism," as Rae describes:
"One historical fact about race asserts itslef in every aspect of New Haven's history after about 1950. The timing of the black migration to New Haven was an economic horror: if the goal was to capture high wage manufacturing jobs in and near central-city neighborhoods -- jobs that could be performed without advanced education -- the timing couldn't have been worse." (p. 258)
And another nice quote: "Ardie's adult life was spent struggling against the swift tide of creative destruction, at its point of convergence with racial segregation, at increasing spatial separation from an incresingly decentralized industrial system. She had, by the time she left town, lived through the end of urbanism." (p. 260)
Three actions which reinforced neighborhood inequality --
1. municipal zoning
2. neighborhood security studies of HOLC (Home Owners Loan Corp.)
3. initial phases of public housing
Zoning defined on p. 261. Initially zoning was a reaction to negative environmental and health effects of industrial production. In New Haven, as elsewhere, they separated heavy industry and commerce from residential areas. Major effect: "...to shift spaces away from heterogeneity of uses. No longer would it be easy to turn a corner house into a corner store. No longer would mixed-use neighborhoods be seen as the urban norm." According to Jane Jacobs, this leads to a reduction of security, confidence, real human value.
HOLC and New Deal evaluations of neighborhoods:
**practice of REDLINING, which created a self-fulfilling prophecy of decline in areas where minorities were concentrated. Criteria clearly racist, see p. 265. HOLC rejected the very idea of a diverse, immigrant city. Racism did reflect values that drove the housing market. see p. 266. HOLC team clearly placed great weight on newness and on isolation from difference, which obviously favored suburban housing.
"HOLC's stated intention in conducting residential security studies was to steer mortgage money toward economically safe neighborhoods and away from economically dangerous ones....the HOLC evaluations achieved that goal through accurate appraisal, given the historical prejudices abroad in the real estate markets of that period." (pp. 272-3)
Public housing begins (Elm Haven). No stigma in early years of public housing. But would come to be looked upon very negatively. Despite the best of intentions, public housing tends to anchor people (mainly Blacks) to poor neighborhoods with few opportunities. Concentration effects of so many poor people in the projects -- crime, drugs, etc. (June Manning Thomas talks about this in Detroit.)
Ghetto comes to be identified with Blacks (defined, p. 280). "The intense marginalization of black ghettoes is an inescapable element in the end of urbanism story." (p. 280)
Sunday, October 10, 2010
Summary Comments: Chapter 7
CHAPTER 7, BUSINESS AND CIVIC EROSION, 1917-1950
Rae opens by reminding us of the power of the "creative destruction" of capitalism in a quote from Lewis Mumford's "City in History." (endnote #1)
The urbanizing technologies of the 19th century -- those centripetal forces -- had run their course by the time of Mayor Frank Rice's death (1917). So, we are reminded again about the decentralizing forces about to be unleashed. (see mid. p. 216)
Note the tremendous production and profit spikes of industry during WWI. And because of their growth, these companies became more national and eventually international and lost their local grounding. Less and less concern for the health and well-being of New Haven. This was such a big loss because these businesses had provided the tax revenue, jobs, (the "economic juice"), leadership that made governance during the Rice administration that much easier. (p. 218)
(1) The impact on labor (in terms of loss of jobs primarily) was especially great. (see bottom pp. 220-1)
(2) The out-migration of major industry did not take place overnight. It was a slow but irreversible movement, facilitated by movement away from the fixed-route rail system to the variable-route trucking/auto system, which would be greatly accelerated after 1960 when highways improved greatly.
Then, comes the automobile and the "smell of profit."
"Urban Thrombosis" -- clogging the arteries of the city; at first, the automobile clogged central city streets before it opened up the metro. area to development.
(1) At first the automobile is for the privileged only, but Henry Ford's Model T would change all that, making the car affordable for almost anyone. Amazing how rapidly it caught on. Also significant were all the other manufacturing interests that got behind it too. (see, bottom, p. 225) By the mid 1930s, as many as 100,000 cars and trucks were penetrating the city center of New Haven.
Rae notes growth of suburbs before mid-century, at first supported by the trolley. Suburban development would eventually lead to out-migration not just of people but perhaps more important, taxable property -- the "grand list" of homes, etc.
Consolidation in the grocery business with A&P, undercutting the "thick fabric of enterprise" of some 600 small, neighborhood "mom & pop" stores, which provided a livelihood for so many as well. "Relentless price competition, reliable supply chains, and strategic location made these stores formidable machines of creative destruction." (p. 238) They were "factory assembly lines for consumption." (p. 238) And they would eventually be overtaken by even larger superstores, like the 8- theater complexes replacing the single theater, and now 8-theater complexes being replaced by 16 and 24-theater complexes. "If a thing is worth doing, it is often, in the heat of capitalist turmoil, worth overdoing." (p. 241) And as local chains are bought up by larger national chains, there is less and less cocnern for local life.
Rae reminds us of the importance of the rich "civic fauna" of voluntary organizations which is now threatened. Catholic parish system, other religious groups, hold on, but many other voluntary organizations go out of existence. Charitable organizations come to be managed by professional social workers (replacing the "blue collar potentates").
And Yale spreads its wings and reaches out for national prominence; selects a president who is NOT from the New Haven area or a member of the "club." Note Yale transformation, top, p. 248.
Nice summary of these changes, last long paragraph, pp. 252-253.
_______________________
That's all for now. I'll post summary comments on Chapter 8 soon.
Rae opens by reminding us of the power of the "creative destruction" of capitalism in a quote from Lewis Mumford's "City in History." (endnote #1)
The urbanizing technologies of the 19th century -- those centripetal forces -- had run their course by the time of Mayor Frank Rice's death (1917). So, we are reminded again about the decentralizing forces about to be unleashed. (see mid. p. 216)
Note the tremendous production and profit spikes of industry during WWI. And because of their growth, these companies became more national and eventually international and lost their local grounding. Less and less concern for the health and well-being of New Haven. This was such a big loss because these businesses had provided the tax revenue, jobs, (the "economic juice"), leadership that made governance during the Rice administration that much easier. (p. 218)
(1) The impact on labor (in terms of loss of jobs primarily) was especially great. (see bottom pp. 220-1)
(2) The out-migration of major industry did not take place overnight. It was a slow but irreversible movement, facilitated by movement away from the fixed-route rail system to the variable-route trucking/auto system, which would be greatly accelerated after 1960 when highways improved greatly.
Then, comes the automobile and the "smell of profit."
"Urban Thrombosis" -- clogging the arteries of the city; at first, the automobile clogged central city streets before it opened up the metro. area to development.
(1) At first the automobile is for the privileged only, but Henry Ford's Model T would change all that, making the car affordable for almost anyone. Amazing how rapidly it caught on. Also significant were all the other manufacturing interests that got behind it too. (see, bottom, p. 225) By the mid 1930s, as many as 100,000 cars and trucks were penetrating the city center of New Haven.
Rae notes growth of suburbs before mid-century, at first supported by the trolley. Suburban development would eventually lead to out-migration not just of people but perhaps more important, taxable property -- the "grand list" of homes, etc.
Consolidation in the grocery business with A&P, undercutting the "thick fabric of enterprise" of some 600 small, neighborhood "mom & pop" stores, which provided a livelihood for so many as well. "Relentless price competition, reliable supply chains, and strategic location made these stores formidable machines of creative destruction." (p. 238) They were "factory assembly lines for consumption." (p. 238) And they would eventually be overtaken by even larger superstores, like the 8- theater complexes replacing the single theater, and now 8-theater complexes being replaced by 16 and 24-theater complexes. "If a thing is worth doing, it is often, in the heat of capitalist turmoil, worth overdoing." (p. 241) And as local chains are bought up by larger national chains, there is less and less cocnern for local life.
Rae reminds us of the importance of the rich "civic fauna" of voluntary organizations which is now threatened. Catholic parish system, other religious groups, hold on, but many other voluntary organizations go out of existence. Charitable organizations come to be managed by professional social workers (replacing the "blue collar potentates").
And Yale spreads its wings and reaches out for national prominence; selects a president who is NOT from the New Haven area or a member of the "club." Note Yale transformation, top, p. 248.
Nice summary of these changes, last long paragraph, pp. 252-253.
_______________________
That's all for now. I'll post summary comments on Chapter 8 soon.
Friday, October 1, 2010
Summary Comments on Chapters 4, 5 & 6
CHAPTER 4: LIVING LOCAL
"The urbanist city was full of citizens who were committed to it -- by choice, by chance of birth, by economic necessity, or by some combination of these...." (p.113) Rae then goes on to describe the "fully grounded city citizen," as opposed to the mere visitor or suburban commuter.
Rae follows up with some comments about "urbanity," or the quality of being "urbane," which entails contact with people of very different socio-economic and cultural backgrounds. And for the city to function and interaction to work, one needs to be urbane, which is also a hallmark of civilzation. (p. 114)
(1) But modern cities are more organized so as to minimize contact with difference; Rae describes what so many cities like New Haven have become -- "a pattern of organized isolation." (p. 115 mid)
There is a fair amount (perhaps too much) of boring detail about who lived where, but the overall point is well-taken: that different classes, different statuses (eg. professors, seamstresses, laborers, etc.), different ethnicities all identified with and lived in the city of New Haven.
"Close Quarters, Strange Voices" (p. 136) does recognize the downside of this "grounded localism:" very high densities, deplorable conditions of tenements, back tenements being "a frightfully wasteful method of housing, morally and socially, as well as economically."
Rae concludes with some interesting comments about the "suburbs within," one of which would later become an area for public housing and not much else. (pp. 138-40)
Today, separation of work and life is enscribed in the layout of the city.
CHAPTER 5: CIVIC DENSITY
The two opening quotes are a real key to the rest of the chapter. The importance of voluntary organizations to our democracy is highlighted. Rae staunchly defends Schlesinger's claim that voluntary organizations have been "schools of self-government," especially in cities. And, as he emphasizes later, these voluntary organizations gave many ordinary people opportunities for leadership that they did not have in the workplace. CEOs were also among the leaders of these organizations, but for the most part blue collar folks took charge. Secondly, the idea of "SOCIAL CAPITAL" is crucial. Urbanism was a necessary prerequisite to the development of social capital which is crucial to the well-being of individuals and the larger community.
Voluntary organizations are the "CIVIC FAUNA" -- the animal life of that city habitat.
Amazing how involved in various organizations people were: (see p. 162) "All, or virtually all, of the people who were assembled by these organizations -- whether for religious worship or a fraternal lodge meeting or a sporting contest -- were members of locally grounded communities." (pp. 143-4)
I can personally identify with what Rae says about the importance of Catholic parishes (see, bottom p.150-1). And "...the Catholic parish system, with its intense commitment to place, represents a stabalizing force as the centered, grounded city begins to dissolve (mid to late-20th century)." (p. 152)
Interesting how Yale University and the hospitals were also very much grounded in that community at that time, although that will change later as Yale develops a more national and international focus.
The neighborhood (public) schools played a key part in knitting the diverse population of New Haven together. "The neighborhood school represents civic density at its thickest." (p. 176)
Finally, the last section, "Civic Density and Social Capital Formation," (pp. 181-2) is just excellent from start to finish, and it provides a summary of sorts for chapters 2-5. Social capital, centering, groundedness, civic density -- all key aspects of urbanism at its height, and something we desperately need to restore to cities in the 21st century.
CHAPTER 6: A SIDEWALK REPUBLIC
Conflict between business or property interests and residents' interests is much wider today. At the time of urbanism, these often conflicting interests were closer together -- many more people had a stake in the economic vitality of the city and they lived there as well. Many were small business owners. (see p. 186)
Mayor Rice's attitude toward the "City Beautiful" ideal and the proposals inspired by it was one of disdain and non-action. He had a sense that these proposals were beyond the capacity of city government to achieve. Mayor Rice believed in the market (the private economic sector), which may have worked during his administration, but which would later contribute to the demise of urbanism and the rise of sprawl. Market forces which were behind the auto industry and single family homes dictated a decentralized future.
Mayor Rice was a great mayor in his own right and at that time. He was honest and worked within the limits of what city government could do to satisfy his citizen customers. But he was also lucky to have inherited the city's economic and social strength. Last couple pages of the chapter are interesting and significant. (see, pp. 209-11)
Mayor Rice's greatest achievement -- sidewalks, which as he once said he used to say just to needle (irritate) the grandiose "City Beautiful" proponents.
Significance of referring to Mayor Rice's tenure as mayor as "The Sidewalk Republic" I believe may be to draw a stark contrast with the grandiose ideas of City Beautiful.
"The urbanist city was full of citizens who were committed to it -- by choice, by chance of birth, by economic necessity, or by some combination of these...." (p.113) Rae then goes on to describe the "fully grounded city citizen," as opposed to the mere visitor or suburban commuter.
Rae follows up with some comments about "urbanity," or the quality of being "urbane," which entails contact with people of very different socio-economic and cultural backgrounds. And for the city to function and interaction to work, one needs to be urbane, which is also a hallmark of civilzation. (p. 114)
(1) But modern cities are more organized so as to minimize contact with difference; Rae describes what so many cities like New Haven have become -- "a pattern of organized isolation." (p. 115 mid)
There is a fair amount (perhaps too much) of boring detail about who lived where, but the overall point is well-taken: that different classes, different statuses (eg. professors, seamstresses, laborers, etc.), different ethnicities all identified with and lived in the city of New Haven.
"Close Quarters, Strange Voices" (p. 136) does recognize the downside of this "grounded localism:" very high densities, deplorable conditions of tenements, back tenements being "a frightfully wasteful method of housing, morally and socially, as well as economically."
Rae concludes with some interesting comments about the "suburbs within," one of which would later become an area for public housing and not much else. (pp. 138-40)
Today, separation of work and life is enscribed in the layout of the city.
CHAPTER 5: CIVIC DENSITY
The two opening quotes are a real key to the rest of the chapter. The importance of voluntary organizations to our democracy is highlighted. Rae staunchly defends Schlesinger's claim that voluntary organizations have been "schools of self-government," especially in cities. And, as he emphasizes later, these voluntary organizations gave many ordinary people opportunities for leadership that they did not have in the workplace. CEOs were also among the leaders of these organizations, but for the most part blue collar folks took charge. Secondly, the idea of "SOCIAL CAPITAL" is crucial. Urbanism was a necessary prerequisite to the development of social capital which is crucial to the well-being of individuals and the larger community.
Voluntary organizations are the "CIVIC FAUNA" -- the animal life of that city habitat.
Amazing how involved in various organizations people were: (see p. 162) "All, or virtually all, of the people who were assembled by these organizations -- whether for religious worship or a fraternal lodge meeting or a sporting contest -- were members of locally grounded communities." (pp. 143-4)
I can personally identify with what Rae says about the importance of Catholic parishes (see, bottom p.150-1). And "...the Catholic parish system, with its intense commitment to place, represents a stabalizing force as the centered, grounded city begins to dissolve (mid to late-20th century)." (p. 152)
Interesting how Yale University and the hospitals were also very much grounded in that community at that time, although that will change later as Yale develops a more national and international focus.
The neighborhood (public) schools played a key part in knitting the diverse population of New Haven together. "The neighborhood school represents civic density at its thickest." (p. 176)
Finally, the last section, "Civic Density and Social Capital Formation," (pp. 181-2) is just excellent from start to finish, and it provides a summary of sorts for chapters 2-5. Social capital, centering, groundedness, civic density -- all key aspects of urbanism at its height, and something we desperately need to restore to cities in the 21st century.
CHAPTER 6: A SIDEWALK REPUBLIC
Conflict between business or property interests and residents' interests is much wider today. At the time of urbanism, these often conflicting interests were closer together -- many more people had a stake in the economic vitality of the city and they lived there as well. Many were small business owners. (see p. 186)
Mayor Rice's attitude toward the "City Beautiful" ideal and the proposals inspired by it was one of disdain and non-action. He had a sense that these proposals were beyond the capacity of city government to achieve. Mayor Rice believed in the market (the private economic sector), which may have worked during his administration, but which would later contribute to the demise of urbanism and the rise of sprawl. Market forces which were behind the auto industry and single family homes dictated a decentralized future.
Mayor Rice was a great mayor in his own right and at that time. He was honest and worked within the limits of what city government could do to satisfy his citizen customers. But he was also lucky to have inherited the city's economic and social strength. Last couple pages of the chapter are interesting and significant. (see, pp. 209-11)
Mayor Rice's greatest achievement -- sidewalks, which as he once said he used to say just to needle (irritate) the grandiose "City Beautiful" proponents.
Significance of referring to Mayor Rice's tenure as mayor as "The Sidewalk Republic" I believe may be to draw a stark contrast with the grandiose ideas of City Beautiful.
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